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Abstract The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences un-
der majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective
decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference
includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the
collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under two classes of
majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on ma-
jority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare
an alternative as the winner. In the case of majorities based on difference of
votes, such requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in
votes with respect to the loser alternative taken into account that individuals
are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the
restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences, whereas in the case
of majorities based on difference in support, the requirement has to do with
the difference in the sum of the intensities for the alternatives in contest.
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difference in support · Probability · Transitivity · Triple-acyclicity.
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1 Introduction
Since Condorcet (1785) introduced the Voting Paradox, it is well known that
the aggregation of transitive individual preferences under simple majority rule
could lead to inconsistent collective preferences. Recalling the classical exam-
ple, consider a three-alternative election with alternatives x1, x2, x3 and three
individuals endowed with the following rankings x1x2x3, x2x3x1 and x3x1x2,
where, for instance, x1x2x3 means that x1 is preferred to x2, x2 is preferred
to x3 and x1 is preferred to x3. For each pair of alternatives, each individual
casts a vote for her/his preferred alternative following just assumed orderings.
Adding up these votes, alternatives x1, x2 and x3 defeat x2, x3 and x1 respec-
tively, by two votes to one. In that voting situation, there is a cycle on the
ordering induced by the strict collective preference. In such a case, that prefer-
ence fails on transitivity and on triple-acyclicity given the requirements of such
conditions. To illustrate, assume that alternative x1 defeats x2 and x2 defeats
x3; x1 defeats x3 whenever the strict collective preference is transitive whereas
x3 does not defeat x1 whenever the strict collective preference is triple-acyclic.
Consider now the following voting process’ outcome: x1 defeats x2 and it is
indifferent to x3, and x2 is also indifferent to x3. In this case, the weak collective
preference fails on consistency. Notice that the strict preference associated with
that weak preference behaves right but the indifference relation associated with
the weak preference fails on transitivity.
The idea that the Voting Paradox ‘certainly could not be very likely to ever
be observed in realistic situation’ stated by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976), pro-
motes the probabilistic study of the occurrence of that paradox and of their
consequences under different aggregation rules. In several studies, it is assumed
an a priori probability model to estimate the likelihood of different voting sit-
uations, derived the conditions under which the paradox or the effects of that
appear and reached probabilities through combinatoric calculus. In this con-
text, stand out the studies about simple majority rule (Gehrlein and Fishburn
1976; Fishburn and Gehrlein 1980; Gehrlein 1983), supermajority rules (Bal-
asko and Cre`s 1997; Tovey 1997) or scoring rules (Gehrlein and Fishburn 1980,
1981, 1983; Cervone et al 2005), among others. In other ones, these probabil-
ities are calculated following the Montecarlo simulation methodology. Specif-
ically, the study of the cyclical and intransitive collective decisions under the
simple majority rule are carried out in Campbell and Tullock (1965), Klahr
(1966), DeMeyer and Plott (1970) and Jones et al (1995).
This paper is devoted to analyze and compare the probabilities of consistent
collective decisions over three alternatives for two different classes of majorities
rules: majorities based on difference of votes (Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares
2001; Llamazares 2006; Houy 2007) and majorities based on difference in sup-
port (Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares 2010). Given two alternatives, these
majorities based on differences focus on requiring to an alternative, to be de-
clared the winner, to reach a number of votes or a support that exceeds the
number of votes or the support for the other alternative in a quantity fixed
before the voting process. Therefore, the difference between these two classes
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of majorities restricts to the types of individual preferences considered. In the
first case, individual preferences are understood as crisp preferences, i.e. given
a pair of alternatives individuals declare if they prefer an alternative to another
one or if they are indifferent between them. Here, we distinguish between the
case where individuals are endowed with weak preferences and the case where
individuals are endowed with linear orderings. In the second case, individual
preferences are understood as reciprocal preference relations, i.e. given two
alternatives, individuals declare the degree with which they prefer an alterna-
tive to another one, in other words their intensities of preference, by means of
numerical values in the unit interval.
Coming back to the consistent collective decisions analyzed here, we specif-
ically calculate the probabilities of transitive and triple-acyclic strict collective
preferences and the corresponding ones of transitive weak collective preferences
for the three specifications of majorities based on differences stated before, as
the proportion of collective decisions that fulfill each of such consistency con-
ditions over the total number of possible collective decisions.
To calculate the probabilities of consistent outcomes under majorities based
on difference of votes taken into account weak and linear individual preferences
respectively, we consider that each individual preference ordering is equiproba-
ble by embracing the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition (Gehrlein
and Fishburn 1976) to describe the likelihood of the possible individual order-
ings. On the one hand, assuming weak or linear individual orderings jointly
with the IAC condition allow to know the total number of possible collec-
tive preferences (again, Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976). On the other hand, the
number of consistent profiles is calculated by means of Ehrhart polynomials,
a method recently introduced in the social choice literature by Wilson and
Pritchard (2007) and Lepelley et al (2008) in order to estimate the probabili-
ties of some voting paradoxes under the IAC condition.
In the case of the calculations of the probabilities of consistent outcomes
under majorities based on difference in support, we propose to apply the Mon-
tecarlo simulation methodology to estimate such probabilities inspired by the
studies in Campbell and Tullock (1965), Klahr (1966), DeMeyer and Plott
(1970) and Jones et al (1995).
Specifically, we generate the individual reciprocal preference relations for
the case of three alternatives. Each individual intensity of preference is under-
stood as a continuous random variable in the unit interval consistently built
with a specific transitivity condition over the individual’s reciprocal prefer-
ence relations. Then, we fix the required difference in support and aggregate
these individual preferences with the corresponding majority based on differ-
ence in support. We derive the resultant collective ordering of alternatives and
evaluate its consistency. Finally, we iterate that procedure to estimate desired
probabilities as the number of consistent orderings over the total number of
simulated collective orderings.
The methodology proposed here allows us to hypothesize about a relation-
ship between the type of individual preferences assumed under each rule and
the likelihood of inconsistent collective decisions. Moreover, we set forth our
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results for majorities based on difference of votes with previous ones on simple
majority (Gehrlein (1997) and Lepelley and Martin (2001)). We also are able
to analyze the impact of the types of transitivity conditions for individual re-
ciprocal preferences on the probability of consistent collective decisions under
majorities based on difference in support. In addition, we compare our results
on probabilities with some theoretical ones about the consistency of the collec-
tive preferences under majorities based on difference in support (Llamazares
et al 2013; Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work followed in this paper and introduces majorities based on difference of
votes and majorities based on difference in support. Sections 3 and 4 pro-
vide the results about the probability of consistent collective decisions under
majorities based on difference of votes with linear preferences and with weak
preferences, respectively. Section 5 is devoted to the simulated probabilities in
the case of majorities based on difference in support. Section 6 discusses the
results and concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a set of alternatives X = {x1, x2, x3} in an election with m individ-
uals. Let S be a binary relation on X, i.e. a subset of the cartesian product
X×X. In what follows, xiSxj stands for (xi, xj) ∈ S, i.e. when xi is in the re-
lation S with xj . S
−1 is the inverse relation of S defined by xiS−1xj ⇔ xjSxj
and Sc is the complement relation of S defined by xiS
cxj ⇔ ¬(xiSxj). Given
two binary relations S and T , the intersection of S and T is also a binary
relation defined by xi(S ∩ T )xj ⇔ (xiSxj ∧ xiTxj). A binary relation S on X
is
1. reflexive if ∀x ∈ X, xSx,
2. symmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ⇒ xjSxi,
3. asymmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ⇒ ¬(xjSxi),
4. antisymmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxi)⇒ xi = xj ,
5. complete if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ∨ xjSxi,
6. transitive if ∀xi, xj , xl ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxl)⇒ xiSxl,
7. triple-acyclic if ∀xi, xj , xl ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxl)⇒ ¬(xlSxi).
A weak preference R is a complete binary relation on the set of alternatives
X. The strict preference P associated with R is the asymmetric binary relation
on X defined by P = (R−1)c and the corresponding indifference relation I is
the reflexive and symmetric binary relation on X defined by I = R ∩ R−1.
P(X) is the set of strict preferences. A weak ordering is a transitive weak
preference whereas a linear ordering is also antisymmetric.
From definitions above it is well know that any weak ordering implies
a transitive strict preference relation and a transitive indifference relation.
Moreover, any transitive strict preference is also a triple-acyclic preference
relation. Notice that the converse is not true.
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Given that the social decision between two alternatives is given by either a
strict preference relation or an indifference relation, and that three alternatives
are in contest, we consider the 27 cases in Table 1 as possible social outcomes.
Table 1 Possible social outcomes in a three alternative election.
1. x1Px2 x2Px3 x1Px3 14. x1Px2 x2Ix3 x1Ix3
2. x1Px3 x3Px2 x1Px2 15. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x1Px3
3. x2Px1 x1Px3 x2Px3 16. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x3Px1
4. x2Px3 x3Px1 x2Px1 17. x1Ix3 x3Px2 x1Ix2
5. x3Px1 x1Px2 x3Px2 18. x2Px1 x1Ix3 x2Ix3
6. x3Px2 x2Px1 x3Px1 19. x1Ix2 x2Px3 x1Ix3
7. x1Px2 x2Ix3 x1Px3 20. x1Px2 x2Px3 x1Ix3
8. x2Px1 x1Ix3 x2Px3 21. x3Px1 x1Px2 x2Ix3
9. x3Px1 x1Ix2 x3Px2 22. x2Px3 x3Px1 x1Ix2
10. x1Ix2 x2Px3 x1Px3 23. x3Px2 x1Px3 x1Ix2
11. x2Ix3 x3Px1 x2Px1 24. x2Px1 x1Px3 x2Ix3
12. x1Ix3 x3Px2 x1Px2 25. x3Px2 x2Px1 x1Ix3
13. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x1Ix3 26. x1Px2 x2Px3 x3Px1
27. x2Px1 x1Px3 x3Px2
Our interest focuses on the frequency of consistent social outcomes given
the 27 possible outcomes above. We distinguish among three cases of consis-
tent outcomes; the case of weak orderings corresponding to the first thirteen
outcomes, the case of transitive strict preferences corresponding to the first
nineteen and the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences corresponding to the
first twenty-fifth outcomes.
2.1 Individual preferences
We consider that individuals compare the alternatives on X by pairs and
declare their preferences by means of values rpij ∈ [0, 1], where rpij > 0.5 means
that alternative xi is somewhat preferred to xj by the individual p, whereas
rpij < 0.5 signifies that alternative xj is somewhat preferred to xi by the
individual p. At that point, we distinguish between the general case in which
preferences are represented by reciprocal preferences and the particular case
of that, referred to as crisp preferences.
1. Crisp preferences: the values of rpij are restricted to the set of discrete values
{0, 0.5, 1}. If rpij = 1, individual p prefers alternative xi to alternative xj ,
whereas if rpij = 0, individual p prefers xj to xi. If r
p
ij = 0.5, individual p
is indifferent between both alternatives. Condition rpij + r
p
ji = 1 guarantees
that the preference of individual p is a weak preference. Moreover, the
conditions
(rpij = 1 ∧ rpjl = 1) ⇒ rpil = 1,
(rpij = 0.5 ∧ rpjl = 0.5) ⇒ rpil = 0.5,
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assure that the preference of individual p is a weak ordering. Individual
linear orderings could also be represented in this framework by including
the following condition: rpij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i 6= j. Thus, individuals could only
be indifferent between an alternative and itself.
2. Reciprocal preferences: the values of rpij belong to the unit interval [0, 1]
with the following interpretation: rpij > 0.5 indicates that the individual p
prefers the alternative xi to the alternative xj , the more the nearer is the
value of rpij to 1 that represents the maximum degree of preference for xi
over xj ; conversely, r
p
ij < 0.5, means that individual p prefers alternative
xj to xi, the more the nearer is the value of r
p
ij to 0 that represents the
maximum degree of preference for xj over xi; finally, r
p
ij = 0.5 stands
for the indifference between xi and xj for individual p. The reciprocity of
these preferences is described by the condition rpij + r
p
ji = 1. To avoid the
possibility of having incoherent individual preferences, we need to assume
some kind of rationality condition. But, in this framework, several concepts
could be taken to ensure such rationality requirement (see, among others,
Zadeh 1971; Dubois and Prade 1980; Dasgupta and Deb 1996; Garc´ıa-
Lapresta and Meneses 2005). Here, we consider the following transitivity
conditions for reciprocal preference relations.
Definition 1 We say that individual p is
(a) 0.5–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil > 0.5,
(b) min–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥ min{rpij , rpjl},
(c) am–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥
(
rpij + r
p
jl
)
/2,
(d) max–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥ max{rpij , rpjl}.
The preferences of each individual over the alternatives in X = {x1, x2, x3}
can be represented using a 3× 3 matrix Rp =
Ä
rpij
ä
as follows:
Rp =
Ö
0.5 rp12 r
p
13
1− rp12 0.5 rp23
1− rp13 1− rp23 0.5
è
. (1)
Individual preferences are collected in a vector where each vector-element
represents the preferences of an individual. Assuming m individuals1 and tak-
ing into account the above distinction among linear, weak and reciprocal pref-
erences, a profile of linear orderings is a vector (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ L(X)m, being
1 To calculate the probabilities presented here, m takes the following values: 3, 4, 5, 10,
100, 1,000 and 100,000.
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L(X) the set of all linear orderings; a profile of weak orderings is a vector
(R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ W(X)m, beingW(X) the set of all weak orderings; and a pro-
file of reciprocal preferences is a vector (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ R(X)m, being R(X)
the set of all reciprocal preference relations.
2.2 Majorities based on differences
Given the nature of the three types of individual preferences examined in
Subsection 2.1, we also consider three different specifications of majorities
based on differences relying on the types of individual preferences that we
take into account in each case. In what follows, we refer to these majorities as
majorities based on difference of votes with linear orderings, majorities based
on difference of votes with weak orderings and majorities based on difference
in support for reciprocal preference relations.
The concept of majorities based on difference of votes was introduced
in Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2001) and was later axiomatically char-
acterized in Llamazares (2006), and subsequently in Houy (2007). These rules
involve crisp preferences, i.e. given a pair of alternatives, individuals could
declare their preference for one of them or their indifference between both
alternatives.
Under these majorities, an alternative, say xi, is declared the winner if the
number of individuals who prefer that alternative, to the other one, say xj ,
exceeds the number of individuals who prefer xj to xi in a difference of votes,
fixed before the election process. Assuming m individuals, that difference could
take any integer value in {0, . . . ,m−1}. These majorities are located between
simple majority rule where the difference of votes is zero and unanimity where
the difference of votes is the total number of individuals m minus one. More-
over, if the indifference state is ruled out from individual preferences, these
majorities are equivalent to supermajority rules.
Taking into account the former majorities based on difference of votes, we
introduce in Definition 2 the majorities based on difference of votes with linear
orderings and in Definition 3 the majorities based on difference of votes with
weak orderings. In what follows, the symbol # stands for the cardinality of a
set.
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Definition 2 (Majorities based on difference of votes with linear or-
derings or MLk′ majorities)
Given k′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1}, the majority based on difference of votes with lin-
ear orderings or MLk′ majority is the mapping M
L
k′ : L(X)m −→ P(X) defined
by MLk′(R
1, . . . , Rm) = PLk′ , where
xi P
L
k′ xj ⇔ #{p | rpij = 1} > #{p | rpji = 1}+ k′.
The indifference relation associated with PLk′ is as follows:
xi I
L
k′ xj ⇔
∣∣∣#{p | rpij = 1} −#{p | rpji = 1}∣∣∣ ≤ k′.
Example 1 Let RI and RII be the following individual linear preference or-
derings over the alternatives on X = {x1, x2, x3}.
RI =
Ñ
0.5 1 1
0 0.5 1
0 0 0.5
é
, RII =
Ñ
0.5 0 1
1 0.5 1
0 0 0.5
é
.
Consider the profile (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) where
Rp =
®
RI if p = 1, 2, 3,
RII if p = 4, 5.
Assuming a required difference of votes k′ equal to 1 and applying the corre-
sponding ML1 majority we have
|#{p | rp12 = 1} −#{p | rp21 = 1}| = |3− 2| ≤ 1⇒ x1 IL1 x2,
#{p | rp23 = 1} = 5 > #{p | rp32 = 1}+ 1 = 0 + 1⇒ x2 PL1 x3,
#{p | rp13 = 1} = 5 > #{p | rp31 = 1}+ 1 = 0 + 1⇒ x1 PL1 x3.
Definition 3 (Majorities based on difference of votes with weak or-
derings or Mk′ majorities)
Given k′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}, the majority based on difference of votes with weak
orderings or Mk′ majority is the mapping Mk′ :W(X)m −→ P(X) defined by
Mk′(R
1, . . . , Rm) = Pk′ , where
xi Pk′ xj ⇔ #{p | rpij = 1} > #{p | rpji = 1}+ k′.
The indifference relation associated with Pk′ is as follows:
xi Ik′ xj ⇔
∣∣∣#{p | rpij = 1} −#{p | rpji = 1}∣∣∣ ≤ k′.
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Example 2 Let RI and RII be the following individual weak preference order-
ings over the alternatives on X = {x1, x2, x3}.
RI =
Ñ
0.5 1 0.5
0 0.5 0
0.5 1 0.5
é
, RII =
Ñ
0.5 0.5 1
0.5 0.5 1
0 0 0.5
é
.
Consider the profile (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) where
Rp =
®
RI if p = 1, 2, 3,
RII if p = 4, 5.
Assuming a required difference of votes k′ equal to 2 and applying the corre-
sponding M2 majority we have
#{p | rp12 = 1} = 3 > #{p | rp21 = 1}+ 2 = 0 + 2⇒ x1 P2 x2,
|#{p | rp23 = 1} −#{p | rp32 = 1}| = |2− 3| ≤ 2⇒ x2 I2 x3,
|#{p | rp13 = 1} −#{p | rp31 = 1}| = |2− 0| ≤ 2⇒ x1 I2 x3.
In Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2010), majorities based on differences
of votes were extended to the framework of reciprocal preferences allowing
individuals to declare their degrees of preferences over pairs of alternatives.
Majorities based on difference in support allow us to aggregate each profile
of reciprocal preferences into a strict collective preference Pk over the set of
alternatives. Under these rules, the winner alternative is required to reach a
support that exceeds the support for the other alternative in a quantity, fixed
before the voting process. Formal definition for these majorities is as follows.
Definition 4 (Majorities based on difference in support or M˜k ma-
jorities (Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares 2010))
Given k ∈ [0,m), the majority based on difference in support or M˜k majority
is the mapping M˜k : R(X)m −→ P(X) defined by M˜k(R1, . . . , Rm) = Pk,
where
xi Pk xj ⇔
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m∑
p=1
rpji + k. (2)
The indifference relation associated with Pk is defined by:
xi Ik xj ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
p=1
rpij −
m∑
p=1
rpji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k. (3)
Notice that when considering crisp preferences, the expression in (2) goes
for defining the majorities based on difference of votes with linear and weak
preference orderings.
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Example 3 Let RI and RII be the following reciprocal preference relations
over the alternatives on X = {x1, x2, x3}.
RI =
Ñ
0.5 1 0.9
0 0.5 0.6
0.1 0.4 0.5
é
, RII =
Ñ
0.5 0.8 1
0.2 0.5 0.7
0 0.3 0.5
é
.
Consider the profile (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) where
Rp =
®
RI if p = 1, 2, 3,
RII if p = 4, 5.
Assuming a required difference in support k equal to 1.75 and applying the
corresponding M˜1.75 majority we have
5∑
p=1
rp12 = 4.6 >
5∑
p=1
rp21 + 1.75 = 0.4 + 1.75⇒ x1 P1.75 x2,∣∣∣∣∣∣
5∑
p=1
rp23 −
5∑
p=1
rp32
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |3.2− 1.8| ≤ 1.75⇒ x2 I1.75 x3,
5∑
p=1
rp13 = 4.7 >
5∑
p=1
rp31 + 1.75 = 0.3 + 1.75⇒ x1 P1.75 x3.
3 Probability of consistent collective decisions under majorities
based on difference of votes with linear orderings
In this section the results about the probabilities of consistent collective deci-
sions under MLk′ majorities are introduced under IAC assumption. Given that
voters are endowed with complete linear preference orderings, there are six
possible preference orders that they might have,
x1x2x3 (m1) x1x3x2 (m2) x2x1x3 (m3)
x2x3x1 (m4) x3x1x2 (m5) x3x2x1 (m6)
(4)
wheremi is the number of voters with the associated linear preference ordering.
In this framework, a voting situation is a vector m = (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6)
such that
6∑
i=1
mi = m. As the IAC condition is assumed, all possible voting
situations m are equally liked to be observed. Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976)
showed that for m agents and 3 alternatives, the total number of voting situ-
ations m is given by the expression:
ψ(m) =
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 3)(m+ 4)(m+ 5)
120
. (5)
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3.1 Probabilities of triple-acyclic strict preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with linear orderings
To calculate the probability of triple-acyclic strict preferences under MLk′ ma-
jorities we focus on the cases from 1 to 25 in Table 1. Specifically, we first cal-
culate the probability of cyclic strict preferences, i.e. the probability of having
preferences like the ones described in the cases 26 and 27 (see again Table 1).
Thereafter, we obtain the probability of triple-acyclic cases as 1 minus the
probability of cyclic strict preferences.
Going deeper on the strict preference described in the case 26, we notice
that for such preference to exist, the numbers of voters associated with the
linear orderings described in (4) have to fulfil the following conditions: m1 +
m2 − m3 − m4 + m5 − m6 > k′, m1 − m2 + m3 + m4 − m5 − m6 > k′ and
−m1 −m2 −m3 +m4 +m5 +m6 > k′.
In other words, the strict preference in the case 26 requires a voting sit-
uation m = (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6) that fulfils the conditions given by the
system of inequalities below.
(x1P
L
k′x2, x2P
L
k′x3 andx3P
L
k′x1)⇒

m1 +m2 −m3 −m4 +m5 −m6 > k′,
m1 −m2 +m3 +m4 −m5 −m6 > k′,
−m1 −m2 −m3 +m4 +m5 +m6 > k′,
mi ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 6},
m− 1 ≥ k′ ≥ 0,
m1 +m2 +m3 +m4 +m5 +m6 = m.
Therefore, to calculate the probability of cyclic strict preferences, we need
to solve the system of linear inequalities derived from conditions that the
numbers of voters associated with the linear orderings in (4) have to hold for
strict preferences like the ones in the cases 26 and 27 to exist.
We compute the number of voting situations that fulfil these conditions by
means of the Parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm (Verdoolaege et al (2004))2.
Such algorithm allows to quantify the number of integer solutions for sys-
tems of inequalities with parameters. The connection of such algorithm to So-
cial Choice Theory was recently pointed out by Wilson and Pritchard (2007)
and Lepelley et al (2008).
Given the two parameters m and k′, the number of voting situations m
for our system is given by bivariate quasi polynomials in m and k′ with 2-
periodic coefficients meaning that such coefficients depend on the parity of
the parameters m and k′. Following the notation introduced in Lepelley et al
(2008), we represent these coefficients by a list of 2 rational numbers enclosed
in square brackets. To illustrate, assume the bracketed list [[a, b]m , [b, a]m]k′ .
In the case of even k′, the relevant list corresponds to [a, b]m. The coefficient
will be either a when m is even or b when m is odd. Accordingly, in the case
2 The free software to calculate the integer points under the Parameterized Barvinok’s
algorithm can be found in http://freecode.com/projects/barvinok.
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of odd k′, the relevant list is [b, a]m and therefore, the coefficient will be either
b when m is even or a when m is odd. Thus, the coefficient will be a when m
and k′ have the same the parity and b otherwise.
Notice that in the case of the cyclical strict preferences depicted in the
cases 26 and 27 (Table 1), the number of solutions in the system of inequalities
derived from the strict preference in the case 26 is the same as in the system
derived from the strict preference in the case 27 given the symmetry of such
cases. The program indicates that the corresponding quasi polynomial for each
of these cases is as follows:
− 81
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k′5 +
(
27
256
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[ ï
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256
ò
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,
ï
81
256
, 0
ò
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.
In addition, the program points out that this relation holds only if k′ ≤
(m− 3)/3. Otherwise, the number of voting situations is zero.
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We simplify3 the quasi polynomial above by considering different values
of m and k′. Thus, it can be deduced that the number of voting situations
corresponding to each of the strict preferences represented by the cases 26 and
27 in Table 1 is given by F1(m, k
′) if both m and k′ are odd (or even) and by
F2(m, k
′) if one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even
such that:
F1(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− 3 k′ − 4) (m− 3 k′) (m− 3 k′ + 4)
(m− 3 k′ − 2) (m− 3 k′ + 2)
ã
.
F2(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− 3 k′ + 3) (m− 3 k′ + 7) (m− 3 k′ + 1)
(m− 3 k′ + 5) (m− 3 k′ − 1)
ã
.
As a consequence of the above number of voting situations and taking into
account the symmetry of the strict preferences of the cases 26 and 27 in Ta-
ble 1 and the total number of voting situations ψ(m) in (5), we introduce the
probabilities of having triple-acyclic strict preferences under MLk′ majorities in
the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a three candidate election with m voters under MLk′
majority rules where each individual vote consists of a linear preference or-
dering on the candidates. Assuming that all voting situations are equally likely
(IAC), if k′ ≤ (m − 3)/3, the probability of triple-acyclic strict preference is
as follows:
– If both m and k′ are odd (or even):
1− 2F1(m, k
′)
ψ(m)
.
– If one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even:
1− 2F2(m, k
′)
ψ(m)
.
Computed values of this probability are listed in Table 2. The values of
the difference of votes k′ correspond to the ones that provide a probability
of triple-acyclic strict preferences equal to 1. As it is previously mentioned,
these probabilities indicate that the number of solutions in the systems of
inequalities corresponding to the cyclic strict preferences (cases 26 and 27 in
Table 1) are equal to zero when k′ > (m− 3)/3.
Some interesting facts could be emphasized from the probabilities in Ta-
ble 2.
3 Such simplification is done with Maple software.
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Table 2 Probability of triple-acyclic PL
k′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9643 1 0.9524 0.9860 0.9462 0.9384 0.9375
1 1 1 0.9860 0.9462 0.9384 0.9375
2 1 0.9605 0.9403 0.9375
32 1 0.9628 0.9378
332 1 0.9406
33,332 1
First, ML0 majority provide a probability of triple-acyclic strict preferences
equal to 1 for the case of m = 4 whereas a difference of votes equal to 1 is
necessary in the case of m = 3 and m = 5 to achieve such probability. We
conjecture that this odd result attends to the fact that the likelihood of having
ties is greater in the case of an even number of individuals than in the case
of an odd number of individuals when these voters are endowed with linear
orderings.
Second, the weight of the difference of votes necessary to achieve a prob-
ability of triple-acyclic strict preferences over the total number of votes equal
to 1 increases with the number of individuals from m = 10 to m = 100,000.
In the case of m = 10 required difference signifies a 20% of the value of m, a
32% in the case of m = 100, a 33.2% in the case of m = 1,000 and a 33.332%
in the case of m = 100,000.
Third, the probabilities do not reflect small changes in the magnitude of
the thresholds. See for instance, the probabilities attached to the cases m = 10,
m = 100 and m = 1,000 for the values of the difference k′ equal to 0 and 1
and for the case of m = 100,000 in the case of k′ equal 0, 1 and 2.
Finally, triple-acyclic strict preferences under MLk′ majorities can be guar-
anteed with a probability of 1 for not too demanding differences of votes.
3.2 Probabilities of transitive strict preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with linear orderings
To study the probability of transitive strict preferences under MLk′ majorities,
we follow the same methodology as the one applied in Subsection 3.1 adding
the cases 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 in Table 1 to the outcomes 26 and 27
analyzed in the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences. Once we calculate the
probability of non transitive strict preferences collected in the cases from 20
to 27, we determine the probability of transitive strict preferences as 1 minus
the previous probability.
Ordinary preferences collected in cases from 20 to 25 are similar and hence,
the number of integer solutions given by Barvinok’s algorithm is the same in
each of the six systems of inequalities representing these strict preferences.
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For these cases, two validity domains can be distinguished. On the one
hand, if k′ ≤ (m− 3)/3, the number of voting situations is given by G1(m, k′)
if both m and k′ are odd (or even) and by G2(m, k′) if one of the parameters
(m or k′) is odd and the other one is even such that:
G1(m, k
′) =
1
1920
(k′ + 1)
Ä
121 k′4 − 116 k′3 − 200mk′3 + 180mk′2−
164 k′2 + 130m2k′2 + 144 k′ − 40m3k′ − 100m2k′ + 120mk′−
20m2 − 80m+ 5m4 + 20m3) .
G2(m, k
′) =
1
1920
k′
Ä
121 k′4 − 200mk′3 − 600 k′3 + 130m2k′2 + 780mk′2+
910 k′2 − 40m3k′ − 360m2k′ − 840mk′ − 360 k′ + 5m4+
60m3 + 210m2 + 180m− 71) .
On the other hand, if (m−2)/3 ≤ k′ ≤ m−2, the number of voting situations
is given by G3(m, k
′) if both m and k′ are odd (or even) and by G4(m, k′) if
one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even such that:
G3(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− k′ − 2) (m− k′ + 4) (m− k′)
(m− k′ + 6) (m− k′ + 2)
ã
.
G4(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− k′ + 7) (m− k′ + 3) (m− k′ − 1)
(m− k′ + 5) (m− k′ + 1)
ã
.
Bearing in mind above numbers of voting situations, the results in Propo-
sition 1 and the total number of voting situations ψ(m) in (5), we derive the
probability of transitive strict preferences under MLk′ majorities as follows.
Proposition 2 Consider a three candidate election with m voters under MLk′
majority rule where each individual vote consists of a linear preference ordering
on the candidates. Assuming that all voting situations are equally likely (IAC),
the probability of transitive strict preferences is as follows:
1. If k′ ≤ (m− 3)/3
– If both m and k′ are odd (or even):
1− 2F1(m, k
′) + 6G1(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
– If one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other is even:
1− 2F2(m, k
′) + 6G2(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
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2. If (m− 2)/3 ≤ k′ ≤ m− 2
– If both m and k′ are odd (or even):
1− 6G3(m, k
′)
ψ(m)
.
– If one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other is even:
1− 6G4(m, k
′)
ψ(m)
.
Computed values of this probability are listed in Table 3. Going deeper on
them, the weight of the required difference of votes k′ to guarantee a probabil-
ity of transitive strict preferences equal to 1 with respect to the total number
of individuals increases as the number of individuals does. To illustrate, in the
case of m = 3 the required k′ = 1 represents around a 33.33% of the value of m
whereas in the case of m = 100,000 the required k′ represents a 99.998% of the
value of m. In fact, the required differences are very large for all the considered
cases with the exception of m = 3. Even for m = 4, the difference signifies a
50% of the value of m. For not too demanding differences, the probabilities
increase in the cases of m = 4, m = 5 and m = 10; this is not the case for
m = 100, m = 1,000 and m = 100,000 where asking reasonable differences of
votes decreases the probability of transitive strict preferences.
Table 3 Probability of transitive PL
k′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9643 0.9524 0.9524 0.9161 0.9293 0.9366 0.9375
1 1 0.9524 0.9762 0.9161 0.9293 0.9366 0.9375
2 1 0.9762 0.9580 0.9175 0.9348 0.9375
3 1 0.9580 0.9175 0.9348 0.9375
8 1 0.9088 0.9298 0.9374
98 1 0.9101 0.9366
998 1 0.9290
99,998 1
Moreover, as in the case of the probabilities stated in Table 2, small vari-
ations in the magnitude of the differences of votes do not change, at least in
a significant way, the probabilities. To illustrate, look at the probabilities of
m = 100,000 with differences k′ equal to 0, 1, 2 and 3.
3.3 Probabilities of transitive weak preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with linear orderings
To derive the probability of transitive weak preferences under MLk′ majorities,
we need to consider, in addition with the cases analyzed in Proposition 2, the
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cases from 14 to 19 in Table 1. With that, we calculate the probability of non
transitive weak preferences and therefore, the probability of transitive weak
preferences is determined as 1 minus the probability of non transitive weak
preferences.
By symmetry arguments, the weak preferences represented in cases from
14 to 19 are similar and therefore the number of integer solutions of the six
systems of inequalities corresponding to such cases is the same. Using again
the Barvinok’s algorithm, two validity domains can be considered. If k′ ≤
(m − 2)/3, the number of voting situations inside each system is given by
H1(m, k
′) if both m and k′ are odd (or even), and by H2(m, k′) if one of the
parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even such that:
H1(m, k
′) = − 1
240
Å
(k′ + 1)
Ä
17 k′4 − 30mk′3 − 22 k′3 + 20m2k′2−
28 k′2 + 30mk′2 + 50mk′ + 48 k′ − 5m3k′ − 5m2k′−
5m3 − 30m2 − 40m)ã.
H2(m, k
′) = − 1
240
k′
Ä
17 k′4 − 30mk′3 − 90 k′3 + 20m2k′2+
120mk′2 + 140 k′2 − 5m3k′ − 45m2k′ − 100mk′−
30 k′ − 37− 5m2 − 30m) .
For the second validity domain, if (m− 1)/3 ≤ k′ ≤ m− 1, this number is
given by H3(m, k
′) if both m and k′ are odd (or even) and by H4(m, k′) if one
of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even such that:
H3(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− k′ + 2) (m− k′) (m− k′ + 4)Ä
29 k′2 + 12mk′ + 94 k′ + 72−m2 + 6m
äã
.
H4(m, k
′) =
1
3840
Å
(m− k′ + 1) (m− k′ + 5) (m− k′ + 3)Ä
29 k′2 + 12mk′ + 36 k′ − 6m+ 7−m2
äã
.
Taking into consideration the intersections between the different validity do-
mains and using the results in Propositions 1 and 2, the probability of transi-
tive weak preferences is as follows.
Proposition 3 Consider a three candidate election with m voters under MLk′
majority rule where each individual vote consists of a linear preference ordering
on the candidates. Assuming that all voting situations are equally likely (IAC),
the probability of transitive weak preferences is as follows:
1. If k′ ≤ (m− 3)/3
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– If both m and k′ are odd (or even):
1− 2F1(m, k
′) + 6G1(m, k′) + 6H1(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
– If one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even:
1− 2F2(m, k
′) + 6G2(m, k′) + 6H2(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
2. If (m− 1)/3 ≤ k′ ≤ m− 2
– If both m and k′ are odd (or even):
1− 6G3(m, k
′) + 6H3(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
– If one of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even:
1− 6G4(m, k
′) + 6H4(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
3. If k′ = (m− 2)/3
– Either both m and k′ are odd or both are even:
1− 6H1(m, k
′) + 6G3(m, k′)
ψ(m)
.
4. If k′ = m− 1
– One of the parameters (m or k′) is odd and the other one is even:
1− 6H4(m, k
′)
ψ(m)
.
Analyzing the probabilities of transitive weak preferences displayed in Ta-
ble 4, ML0 majority provides the highest values for the probability of having
transitive weak preferences for almost all the considered values of m. In fact,
any difference of votes can be asked to guarantee a probability value of 1. Only
in the cases of m = 1,000 and m = 100,000 the probability arrives to the value
of 1.0000, i.e. the probability approximates to the value of 1 without reaching
it4. Even so, in both cases the required difference of votes is extremely large.
Specifically, it represents a 99.9% of the value of m in the case of m = 1,000
and a 99.999% in the case of m = 100,000.
Finally, as in the previous cases stated in Tables 2 and 3, the probabilities
do not significantly change with small variations of the magnitude of the dif-
ference in votes. On this, see for instance the cases of k′ equal 2 and 3 for m
equal 4, 10, 100, 1,000 and 100,000.
4 Notice that this value also appears in Tables 5, 7, 12, 13, 14 and 15 with the same
meaning.
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Table 4 Probability of transitive RL
k′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9643 0.7619 0.9524 0.8462 0.9280 0.9366 0.9375
2 0.6786 0.7143 0.6667 0.6703 0.9062 0.9346 0.9375
3 0.7143 0.7619 0.6703 0.9062 0.9346 0.9375
4 0.7619 0.6503 0.8818 0.9327 0.9375
9 0.9101 0.8292 0.9287 0.9374
99 0.9997 0.8136 0.9366
999 1.0000 0.9276
99,999 1.0000
4 Probabilities of consistent collective decisions under majorities
based on difference of votes with weak orderings
In this section the results about the probabilities of consistent collective deci-
sions under Mk′ majorities are introduced under the IAC assumption. Given
that voters could be indifferent between the alternatives, we have to take into
account the six linear preference orderings in (4), the six possible orderings
that collect the partial indifference and the one that represents the complete
indifference among three alternatives. Therefore,
x1x2x3 (m1) x1x3x2 (m2) x2x1x3 (m3)
x2x3x1 (m4) x3x1x2 (m5) x3x2x1 (m6)
{x1x2}x3 (m7) {x1x3}x2 (m8) {x2x3}x1 (m9)
x1{x2x3} (m10) x2{x1x3} (m11) x3{x1x2} (m12)
{x1x2x3} (m13)
(6)
where mi represents the number of voters with the associated preference order-
ing and {xixj} stands for the indifference between the alternatives xi and xj .
As the IAC condition is assumed, all possible voting situations m are equally
liked to be observed. For m individuals and 3 alternatives, if the indifference
between alternatives is allowed, the total number of voting situations m is
given by the expression:
Ψ(m) =
(m+ 1)(m+ 2) · · · (m+ 12)
12!
. (7)
Using the same approach applied in Section 3, the probability of consis-
tent outcomes is calculated by means of the computation of the probability
of inconsistent outcomes. As there, such probabilities are given by Ehrhart
polynomials that provide the number of integer points inside the systems of
inequalities that characterize each of the analyzed inconsistent outcomes.
In the framework of the preferences represented in (6), the complexity
of the conditions makes impossible the derivation of a general mathematical
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representation as the one provided in Section 3. This is because for each con-
sidered consistency condition, the number of validity domains and the length
of the polynomials are greater than in the cases of Section 3.
Fortunately, when the number of individuals m and the threshold k′ are
fixed, the probabilities can be calculated for the given number of voting situ-
ations m.
4.1 Probabilities of triple-acyclic strict preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with weak orderings
In Table 5, the probabilities of triple-acyclic strict preferences under Mk′ ma-
jorities are displayed.
The following facts can be pointed our from these results. The probabil-
ities of having triple-acyclic strict preferences when no difference of votes is
required, i.e. when M0 majority is applied, reach very high values. Specifically,
they are located between 0.9571 and 0.9989. For m = 3, m = 4 and m = 5, the
needed difference of votes to achieve a probability value of 1 equals 1. There-
fore, it represents a one third of the value of m in the case of m = 3, a 25% in
the case of m = 4 and a 20% in the case of m = 5. For the remaining consid-
ered values, the weight of the required differences represent around one third
of the value of m which means that we can guarantee with a probability of 1
the triple-acyclicity of strict preferences under Mk′ majorities for reasonable
values of the difference of votes.
Table 5 Probability of triple-acyclic Pk′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9956 0.9989 0.9929 0.9873 0.9627 0.9577 0.9571
1 1 1 1 0.9992 0.9720 0.9589 0.9572
2 1.0000 0.9794 0.9601 0.9572
3 1 0.9851 0.9613 0.9572
33 1 0.9852 0.9576
333 1 0.9611
33,333 1
4.2 Probabilities of transitive strict preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with weak orderings
In Table 6, the probabilities of transitive strict preferences under Mk′ majori-
ties are presented.
It is remarkable that to reach a probability of transitive strict preferences
equal to 1, the weight of the required difference of votes k′ with respect to the
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Table 6 Probability of transitive Pk′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9692 0.9626 0.9531 0.9422 0.9519 0.9565 0.9571
1 1 0.9901 0.9884 0.9632 0.9443 0.9554 0.9571
2 1 0.9971 0.9851 0.9399 0.9542 0.9571
3 1 0.9942 0.9383 0.9531 0.9571
8 1 0.9516 0.9484 0.9570
98 1 0.9597 0.9560
998 1 0.9471
99,998 1
total number of individuals increases as the number of individuals does. For
instance, in the case of m = 4, it represents a 50% of the value of m whereas
in the case of m = 1,000 it does a 99.8% of the value of m.
Moreover, the required differences are too demanding for all the cases with
the exception of the case of m = 3 where it represents one third of the value
of m.
4.3 Probabilities of transitive weak preferences under majorities based on
difference of votes with weak orderings
Probabilities of transitive weak preferences under Mk′ majorities defined for
weak orderings are displayed in Table 7.
Table 7 Probability of transitive Rk′ .
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k′ ↓
0 0.9801 0.8538 0.8920 0.9072 0.9511 0.9565 0.9571
2 0.7890 0.7429 0.7014 0.6980 0.9218 0.9540 0.9571
3 0.8648 0.8167 0.6814 0.9049 0.9527 0.9571
4 0.9176 0.7234 0.8871 0.9514 0.9571
9 0.9919 0.7954 0.9444 0.9570
99 1.0000 0.7782 0.9559
999 1.0000 0.9436
99,999 1.0000
The probability value of 1 is almost achieved for the values of m equal to
100, 1,000 and 100,000. In these cases, the required differences in votes k′ are
so high that signify a 98% of the value of m in the case of m = 100, a 99.8%
in the case of m = 1,000 and a 99.998% in the case of m = 100,000.
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5 Probabilities of consistent collective decisions under majorities
based on difference in support
In this section, we provide the probabilities of reaching consistent collective
decisions under M˜k majorities for three alternatives.
As long as the intensities of preference between each pair of alternatives
can take any value in the continuous interval [0, 1], the IAC model can not
be applied to provide an a priori probability to each possible voting situa-
tion. Therefore the probabilistic analysis carried out in Sections 3 and 4 turns
impossible to study the case of M˜k majorities.
Consequently, we perform a simulation with the software Matlab to esti-
mate these probabilities as the proportion of the number of consistent out-
comes in the simulation over the total number of simulated outcomes. We
generate for each of these values 100,000 outcomes to guarantee our results
with a confidence level of 99% and a sampling error of less than a 0.0041%5.
Below, we describe the methodology applied in the simulations to estimate
the probability for the considered three types of consistent collective decisions
under M˜k majorities, i.e. transitive weak preferences, transitive and triple-
acyclic strict preferences. We follow that scheme taking into account each type
of individual transitive reciprocal relations, i.e. 0.5–transitive, min–transitive,
am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations. Notice that
the matrix in (1) representing a reciprocal preference relation is determined
by the vector composed of the intensities r12, r23 and r13.
1. We randomly generatem vectors representing the transitive reciprocal pref-
erence relations of the m individuals. Such vectors are built bearing in mind
one of the considered transitivity conditions for reciprocal preference rela-
tions.
2. We compute the sum of the individuals’ intensities of preference over each
pair of alternatives through a vector S = (S12, S23, S13) where Sij =
m∑
p=1
rpij .
3. Having in mind the conditions in equations (2) and (3) and the value of
k, the collective decision is evaluated over each pair of alternatives in the
vector S.
5 Assuming a proportion of consistent outcomes P on the population of a 50%, the pro-
portion p in a random sample of size n ≥ 30 for a confidence level of 99%, diverges from the
one of the population in an error of less than :
Prob(|P − p| ≤ ) ≥ 0.99.
Taken into account that the sample proportion p is distributed as N
Ä
P,
√
P (1− P )/n
ä
,
the sampling error  is as follows:
 = zα/2
√
P (1− P )/n.
In our case, n = 100,000 and the corresponding percentile of the normal distribution for a
confidence level of 99% is zα/2 = 2.57. Thus,  ≤ 0.00407.
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4. The collective decision in S is classified following the cases of possible
collective outcomes displayed in Table 1. If it is one of the cases 26 or 27,
the strict preference Pk is not triple-acyclic. If it is one of the cases from
19 to 27, the strict preference Pk is not transitive. Finally, if it is one of
the cases from 14 to 27, the weak preference Rk is not transitive.
5. This four steps are iterated 100,000 times to obtain the number of inconsis-
tent collective decisions. Specifically, the number of simulated outcomes in
which the weak preference Rk is not transitive, in which the strict prefer-
ence Pk is not transitive and in which Pk is not triple-acyclic, respectively.
6. The number of each considered type of consistent social outcomes is com-
puted as the total number of simulated outcomes, i.e. 100,000, minus the
number of inconsistent ones computed in the previous step.
7. Finally, each of the desired probabilities, i.e. the probability of transitive
Rk and the probability of transitive and triple-acyclic Pk, is calculated
as the number of consistent outcomes over the total number of simulated
outcomes.
In the following, the simulated probabilities of consistent collective deci-
sions under M˜k majorities are listed in tables.
5.1 Probability of transitive weak preferences under majorities based on
difference in support
Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide the probabilities of transitive weak preferences
when reciprocal preference relations fulfil 0.5–transitivity, min–transitivity,
am–transitivity and max–transitivity, respectively.
Table 8 Probabilities of transitive Rk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
2.97 1 0.9836 0.9485 0.7630 0.5927 0.7826 0.8655
3.81 1 0.9964 0.9065 0.5481 0.7544 0.8633
4.70 1 0.9748 0.5312 0.7248 0.8609
7.95 1 0.6729 0.6266 0.8518
26.40 1 0.7012 0.7954
84.83 1 0.6156
95.32 0.5913
When the required difference in support equals zero, the harder the transi-
tivity condition over the reciprocal preference relations is, the higher the prob-
abilities of having transitive weak preferences are. To illustrate, notice that the
probabilities vary in between 0.8705 and 0.8835 considering 0.5–transitive re-
ciprocal preference relations, between 0.9455 and 0.9563 taking into account
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Table 9 Probabilities of transitive Rk for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
2.96 1 0.9831 0.9528 0.8015 0.7220 0.8814 0.9400
3.84 1 0.9966 0.9205 0.6776 0.8576 0.9383
4.80 1 0.9809 0.6552 0.8307 0.9366
8.32 1 0.7559 0.7432 0.9291
27.23 1 0.7702 0.8831
95.32 1 0.7189
Table 10 Probabilities of transitive Rk for am–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
2.97 1 0.9812 0.9492 0.8087 0.7738 0.9117 0.9650
3.91 1 0.9971 0.9225 0.7295 0.8904 0.9636
4.91 1 0.9813 0.7043 0.8683 0.9622
7.48 1 0.7370 0.8112 0.9582
27.90 1 0.7873 0.9180
83.01 1 0.7967
95.32 0.7731
Table 11 Probabilities of transitive Rk for max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
2.98 1 0.9842 0.9561 0.8219 0.7867 0.9189 0.9708
3.84 1 0.9964 0.9241 0.7450 0.9003 0.9696
4.72 1 0.9782 0.7188 0.8805 0.9681
7.56 1 0.7495 0.8190 0.9637
25.47 1 0.7720 0.9298
80.00 1 0.8030
95.32 0.7744
min–transitive reciprocal preference relations, between 0.9670 and 0.9751 bear-
ing in mind am–transitive reciprocal preference relations and between 0.9726
and 0.9777 in the case of max–transitive reciprocal relations.
In the case of m = 100,000 again, the stronger the required transitivity
condition over the reciprocal preference relations is, the higher the probabilities
of having transitive weak preferences are. See for instance, the probability
values attached to the difference in support k = 95.32. In the case of 0.5–
transitive reciprocal preference relations, the probability reaches a value of
0.5913, whereas it does a value of 0.7189 in the case of min–transitive reciprocal
preference relations. In the case of am–transitive reciprocal preference relations
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the probability achieves a value of 0.7731 while it does a value of 0.7744 in the
case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
We have found some unexpected results with respect to the needed thresh-
olds to reach probability values equal to 1 for the considered values of m from
3 to 1,000. In some of these cases, the thresholds are almost the same ones
with independence of the required transitivity condition over the reciprocal
preference relations (on this, see the cases of m = 3, m = 4 and m = 5). In the
case of m = 100, the highest thresholds are the ones required when recipro-
cal preference relations are am–transitive and min–transitive, while the lowest
ones are the corresponding thresholds to max–transitive and 0.5–transitive
reciprocal preference relations. Finally, in the case of m = 1,000, the high-
est threshold needed to achieve a probability value of 1 corresponds to min–
transitive reciprocal preference relations. The second highest one corresponds
to 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations, the third one to am–transitive
reciprocal preference relations and the lowest one to max–transitive reciprocal
preference relations. Therefore, in these situations we can not establish a clear
relationship between the strength of the transitivity condition fulfilled by the
reciprocal preference relations and the size of the needed threshold to achieve
a probability value of 1 of having transitive weak preferences.
5.2 Probabilities of transitive strict preferences under majorities based on
difference in support
Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 display the probabilities of transitive strict preferences
Pk when reciprocal preference relations fulfil 0.5–transitivity, min–transitivity,
am–transitivity and max–transitivity, respectively.
Table 12 Probabilities of transitive Pk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
2.58 1 0.9999 0.9995 0.9916 0.8512 0.8287 0.8668
2.97 1 1.0000 0.9970 0.8661 0.8268 0.8659
3.24 1 0.9985 0.8759 0.8257 0.8654
5.17 1 0.9465 0.8267 0.8611
14.51 1 0.9295 0.8440
47.79 1 0.8293
At a first glance, the probability of transitive strict preferences goes to
value of 1 for non zero values of the threshold k for all the considered type of
transitive reciprocal preference relations.
The rhythm of the convergence of these probabilities to 1 depends on the
number of individuals m because in each of the individual transitivity specifi-
cations, it decreases when m increases.
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Table 13 Probabilities of transitive Pk for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
1.96 1 0.9999 0.9997 0.9968 0.9377 0.9271 0.9421
2.49 1 1.0000 0.9993 0.9514 0.9255 0.9414
2.61 1 0.9995 0.9533 0.9254 0.9413
3.47 1 0.9704 0.9248 0.9398
12.51 1 0.9793 0.9291
35.24 1 0.9251
47.79 0.9311
Table 14 Probabilities of transitive Pk for am–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
1.56 1 0.9999 0.9997 0.9973 0.9605 0.9551 0.9672
1.85 1 1.0000 0.9990 0.9655 0.9542 0.9668
2.07 1 0.9995 0.9697 0.9538 0.9665
3.10 1 0.9845 0.9538 0.9653
9.17 1 0.9828 0.9600
33.10 1 0.9570
47.79 0.9629
Table 15 Probabilities of transitive Pk for max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
1.51 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9981 0.9689 0.9619 0.9727
1.66 1 0.9999 0.9989 0.9712 0.9614 0.9725
1.93 1 0.9996 0.9758 0.9608 0.9723
2.78 1 0.9870 0.9607 0.9715
9.72 1 0.9897 0.9662
26.10 1 0.9626
47.79 0.9690
Notice that the strength of the transitivity condition over the reciprocal
preference relations seems to play a role in that convergence. It looks that the
more rational the individuals are, the smaller the thresholds different from
0 needed to induce transitive strict preferences are. The unique exception to
that behavior is found when m = 100, where the threshold with attached
probability value of 1 is slightly lower in the case of am–transitive reciprocal
preference relations (see Table 14) than in the case of max–transitive ones (see
Table 15).
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences 27
To illustrate these general facts, we focus on the required thresholds for
m = 3 and m = 1,000 in the four cases. In the case of 0.5–transitive reciprocal
relations in Table 12, the required threshold equals 2.58 and consequently rep-
resents a 85% of the value ofm. In the case ofm = 1,000, the required threshold
represents less than a 4.8% of the value of m. In the case of min–transitive
reciprocal relations in Table 13, the threshold for reaching a probability of 1 is
1.96 representing less than a 66% in the case of m = 3 whereas it symbolizes
around a 3.5% in the case of m = 1,000. In the case of am–transitive reciprocal
relations in Table 14, the thresholds are 1.56 and 33.10, representing a 52% and
around a 3.3% of the considered numbers of individuals, respectively. Finally,
in the case of max–transitive reciprocal relations in Table 15, the threshold
for m = 3 equals 1.51 and therefore represents around a 50% of the number of
voters and in the case of m = 1,000 represents around a 2.6% of the number
of voters.
5.3 Probabilities of triple-acyclic strict preferences under majorities based on
difference in support
In Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19, we present the results for the simulated prob-
abilities of having triple-acyclic strict preferences when 0.5–transitive, min–
transitive, am–transitive and max–transitive individual preferences are con-
sidered.
Table 16 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
1.32 1 0.9999 0.9998 0.9967 0.9479 0.9013 0.8763
1.50 1 1.0000 0.9983 0.9546 0.9052 0.8768
1.91 1 0.9998 0.9681 0.9135 0.8778
2.65 1 0.9837 0.9270 0.8794
8.29 1 0.9834 0.8926
26.60 1 0.9291
Conclusions are similar to the case depicted in Subsection 5.2. First, com-
puted probabilities are high and go to 1 for non zero values of k in all considered
the cases.
Second, the weight of the needed threshold to reach a probability value of
1 relative to the number of individuals involved in the voting process increases
when the value of m does. For example, consider the probabilities for the case
of am-transitive reciprocal preference relations in Table 18. There, for m = 3,
the probability achieves the value of 1 for a k = 0.56 that represents less than
a 19% of the value of m. Instead, it represents a a 11.1% for m = 10 and less
than a 1.2% for m = 1,000.
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Table 17 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
0.67 1 0.9998 0.9997 0.9971 0.9812 0.9583 0.9467
0.88 1 1.0000 0.9993 0.9817 0.9612 0.9471
0.90 1 0.9993 0.9906 0.9614 0.9472
1.40 1 0.9906 0.9675 0.9481
4.56 1 0.9913 0.9540
14.99 1 0.9687
26.60 0.9799
Table 18 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for am–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
0.56 1 1.0000 0.9998 0.9986 0.9854 0.9743 0.9698
0.67 1 1.0000 0.9995 0.9876 0.9758 0.9700
0.83 1 0.9999 0.9905 0.9775 0.9702
1.11 1 0.9941 0.9804 0.9706
3.34 1 0.9936 0.9730
11.68 1 0.9811
26.60 0.9911
Table 19 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for max–transitive reciprocal preference rela-
tions.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
0.67 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9909 0.9804 0.9753
0.72 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9918 0.9808 0.9753
0.75 1 0.9999 0.9922 0.9811 0.9754
0.99 1 0.9951 0.9834 0.9758
3.58 1 0.9963 0.9786
9.95 1 0.9845
26.60 0.9943
Third, it seems that the harder the transitivity condition over the reciprocal
preference relations is, the lower the weight of threshold required to achieve a
probability of triple-acyclic strict preferences of 1 is. To illustrate, look at the
weights of the thresholds of support k over the four considered cases when m =
10. In the case of 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations (Table 16), the
needed threshold represents a 2.26% of the number of individuals. In the case of
min–transitive reciprocal preference relations (Table 17), k symbolizes a 1.4%
of m. In the case of am–transitive reciprocal preference relations (Table 18)
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the weight of the threshold is a 1.11% of the value of m. Finally, in the case
of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations (Table 19), the weight of the
threshold represents a 0.99% of the number of individuals. As in Subsection 5.2
, the case of m = 100 constitutes an exception to that general behavior. Again,
the threshold in the case of am–transitive reciprocal preference relations (see
Table 18) is softly lower than the one in the case of max–transitive reciprocal
preference relations (see Table 19).
6 Discussion
Since now, we have computed the theoretical probabilities of consistent prefer-
ences under majorities based on difference of votes defined for both individual
linear orderings and weak orderings, and the simulated probabilities of consis-
tent preferences under majorities based on difference in support.
Notice that the results on the probabilities of triple-acyclic strict prefer-
ences under ML0 majority in Table 2 and under M0 majority are consistent
with the corresponding ones in Gehrlein (1997) and in Lepelley and Martin
(2001).
Focusing on the results for majorities based on difference of votes with
linear orderings (Section 3) and with weak orderings (Section 4) we have
the following. In the cases of transitive and triple-acyclic strict preferences,
the probabilities are higher considering weak than linear orderings (see Ta-
bles 2, 3, 5 and 6). In the case of transitive weak preferences, the same is true
when k′ equals 1 and 2 and, with the exception of the case in which m = 4,
also when k′ = 0.
Looking at the results of Subsection 5.1, notice that the probabilities under
M˜0 remains the same for each type of transitive reciprocal preference relation
with independence of the type of consistency condition required to the collec-
tive preference. That counterintuitive result contrasts with the remaining ones
in which the probability increases together with the increase of the number of
social outcomes considered as consistent. That oddity dues to the following.
Taking into account expression (3) the absolute value of the difference between
the sum of the intensities of preference rpij and the sum of the intensities r
p
ij
has to be null to the indifference between alternatives to be declared. As far as
Matlab generates random numbers with 15 decimal positions, the indifference
between alternatives is almost impossible.
Recently some analytical studies about the consistency of majorities based
on difference in support have been developed. These theoretical results rely on
the needed threshold to ensure transitive and triple-acyclic strict preferences
for different types of transitive reciprocal preference relations.
On the one hand, the case of transitive strict preferences is studied in Lla-
mazares et al (2013). The results can be summarized as follows:
1. The transitivity of the strict preference can not be ensured for any threshold
of support k less than m− 1.
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2. The transitivity of the strict preference can not be ensured for any threshold
of support k less than m if the reciprocal preference relations are less
demanding than am–transitive ones.
3. The strict preference is transitive for any threshold of support such that k ∈
[m− 1,m) if the reciprocal preference relations are at least am–transitive
ones.
On the other hand, the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences is analyzed
in Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2013) with the following results:
1. The triple-acyclicity of the strict preference, in the case of 0.5–transitive
reciprocal preference relations, can be guaranteed if the threshold of sup-
port k is located in
[b2m/3c,m) where bac stands for the integer part of
a.
2. The triple-acyclicity of the strict preference, in the case of min–transitive
and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations, can be guaranteed if
the threshold of support k belongs to [m/3,m).
3. In the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations, it conjectures
that strict preference relations are triple-acyclic if the threshold k belongs
to
[b2m/3c/2,m).
The probabilistic results setting here complement the above theoretical
ones by the following reasons. First, thresholds with associated probabilities
of consistent strict preferences equal to 1 are found for all the considered types
of transitive reciprocal preference relations. Second, reasonable thresholds are
required to certify the consistency of the strict preference with a probability
value of 1 in those cases where theoretical results asked a very high threshold to
guarantee such consistency. Third, the conjecture about the needed thresholds
in the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations seems to be true.
Specifically, in the case of transitive strict preferences with 0.5–transitive
and min–transitive reciprocal preference relations, the probabilities achieve the
value of 1 for the considered values of m (see Tables 12 and 13, respectively)
whereas as it is said before, the theoretical result asserts that no threshold
guarantees the transitivity of the strict preference for such types of reciprocal
preference relations.
In the cases of am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference re-
lations, the thresholds that provide a probability value of transitive strict
preference relations equal to 1 are lower than the ones that guarantee the
transitivity of the strict preference in the theoretical framework. To illustrate,
assume m = 1,000. The theoretical result asserts that the threshold k has to
belong to [999, 1,000). By contrast, a probability value of 1 is achieved with a
threshold of 33.10 in the case of am-transitive reciprocal preference relations
and of 26.10 in the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations (see
Tables 14 and 15, respectively).
In the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences, the thresholds to reach a
probability value of 1 again are much lower than the ones required in the
theoretical setting. For instance, assume m = 5. The needed thresholds to
certify triple-acyclic strict preferences are at least 3 in the case of 0.5–transitive
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reciprocal preference relations and 5/3 in the cases of min–transitive and max–
reciprocal preference relations. Attending to the probabilistic analysis, the
needed thresholds to achieve a probability value of 1 are 1.91 in the case of
0.5-transitive reciprocal preference relations (see Table 16), 0.90 in the case of
min–transitive reciprocal preference relations (see Table 17) and 0.75 in the
case of max-transitive reciprocal preference relations (see Table 19).
Attending to the results under the probabilistic approach, the conjecture
in Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2013) seems to be true. In Table 20, we
provide some other examples that support such idea. For instance, look at the
case of m = 100. The probability of triple-acyclic strict preference relations
equals 1 for k = b(2 · 100)/3c/2 = 33.
Table 20 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk in the case of max-transitive reciprocal prefer-
ence relations with k =
[
b2m/3c/2,m
)
.
m 3 4 5 6 7 8 48 49 50 99 100 101
k 1 1 1.5 2 2 2.5 16 16 16.5 33 33 33.5
Probability 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
We conclude with a comment about the comparison among the probabili-
ties of consistent preferences under the considered three specifications of the
majorities based on differences. Notice that the method used to calculate these
probabilities differs from the cases of the two specifications of majorities based
on difference of votes to the case of majorities based on difference in support.
In the first cases, the probability is calculated by counting the integer points
given by systems of inequalities whereas in the second case the probability is
simulated by Montecarlo techniques. Accordingly, we can not make any quan-
titative comparison between the results obtained in the first two cases and in
the third one.
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